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SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS IN STATE COURT
Jennifer J. Johnson*

I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, Congress has gradually usurped the power
of state regulators to enforce state securities laws, and the power of state
courts to adjudicate securities disputes. In 1996, as part of National
Securities Market Improvement Act (NSMIA),1 Congress preempted
state regulatory authority over nationally traded securities, and over
Rule 506 private placements, which represent the bulk of private
offerings.2 In 1998, Congress enacted the Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act (SLUSA)3 in order to restrict most securities fraud class
actions to federal court, where they would be subject to the
jurisprudence of Rule 10b-5 and the strict procedural requirements of
the 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA).4 SLUSA
precludes both state and federal courts from adjudicating certain class
actions that are based upon state statutory or common law and that
allege a misrepresentation in connection with the purchase or sale of
nationally traded securities.5 In 2005, Congress enacted the Class
Action Fairness Act (CAFA),6 which, among its other provisions,
further restricts state courts from adjudicating all but the smallest
securities class actions.7
A major impetus behind these preclusion and preemption statutes was
to curtail abuses by class action lawyers. The PSLRA in particular was
motivated by concerns that plaintiffs‘ counsel were untrustworthy and
filed frivolous lawsuits primarily for their own advantage. 8 The PSLRA
* Erkine Wood Sr. Professor of Law, Lewis and Clark Law School. The author would like to
thank her research assistant Robert S. Scott for his invaluable help on this project.
1. National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416
[hereinafter NSMIA] (codified in scattered sections of 15 and 29 U.S.C.).
2. See Jennifer J. Johnson, Private Placements: A Regulatory Black Hole, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L.
151 (2010) (examining legislative history of NSMIA).
3. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227
[hereinafter SLUSA] (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
4. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub.L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
[hereinafter PSLRA] (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1)(A) (2006).
6. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 [hereinafter CAFA]
(codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2006).
8. For example, Senator Alfonse D'Amato speaking in favor of the enactment of the PSLRA
stated: ―It is time to reform the securities class action litigation from a moneymaking enterprise for
lawyers into a better means of recovery for investors,‖ and that it was time to ―go after the greatest
abuse that is taking place, which is lawyers who do not represent the general public but represent
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therefore imposes strict procedural hurdles, and contains standards for
the appointment of lead plaintiffs‘ counsel. SLUSA, in combination
with CAFA, ensures that class counsel cannot avoid the PSLRA‘s
procedural impediments by filing in state court. There is evidence,
however, that the collective effect of these statutes has been to drive
smaller plaintiffs‘ firms out of the traditional securities litigation market,
and perhaps strengthen larger firms—the very firms Congress sought to
police.9 This Paper presents data that dispossessed plaintiffs‘ lawyers
increasingly have turned to filing alternative class actions in state court.
This Paper evaluates the impact of congressional preemption and
preclusion upon state court securities class actions. Utilizing a
proprietary database, this Paper presents and analyzes a comprehensive
dataset of over 1,500 class actions filed in state courts from 1996–
2010.10 In Part II, this Paper details the permissible space for state
securities class actions in light of congressional restrictions embodied in
SLUSA and CAFA. Part II explains that these statutes have relegated
state court securities class actions primarily to: (1) claims involving
corporate governance, or merger and acquisition (M & A) transactions
based upon the law of the defendant‘s state of incorporation; (2) class
actions involving securities that are not nationally traded when the
controversy is ―local‖; (3) class actions with a relatively small number
of plaintiffs; and (4) possibly class actions solely premised on 1933
Securities Act (1933 Act) claims.
Part III presents the state class action filing data detailing the
numbers, classifications, and jurisdictions of state class action cases that
now occupy state forums. First, as expected, the data indicates that
there are few traditional stock-drop securities class actions litigated in
state court today. The few cases that survive preemption tend to involve
alleged fraud in private offerings against promoters and other
fiduciaries. Second, in spite of the debate over the impact of SLUSA
and CAFA on 1933 Act claims,11 very few plaintiffs attempt to litigate
these claims in state court. Finally, the number of state court class
actions involving M&A transactions is skyrocketing and now surpasses
similar claims filed in federal court.12 Moreover, various class counsel
file their M&A complaints in multiple state jurisdictions and,
increasingly, outside of Delaware.
themselves.‖ 141 CONG. REC. 35,238, 40 (1995) (statement of Sen. D'Amato).
9. See generally, Howard M. Erichson, CAFA's Impact on Class Action Lawyers, 156 U. PA. L.
REV. 1593, 1618–19 (2008) (detailing the impact of PSLRA and CAFA on the class action bar and
suggesting that the plaintiffs‘ bar is now more concentrated).
10. See infra Part III.A.
11. See infra Part II.C.
12. State court class actions involving merger and acquisitions (M&A) are permissible under
SLUSA pursuant to the Delaware Carve-Out. See infra notes 109–19 and accompanying text.
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Part IV describes the growing problems generated by the large
number of multi-forum M&A class action suits and the burdens they
impose on plaintiffs‘ counsel, the defendants and their counsel, and the
judiciary. Part V suggests potential outcomes resulting from the
proliferation of the M&A suits in multiple state courts. Part VI
concludes that absent effective state coordination, further congressional
preemption is possible, if not likely.
II. FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS IN STATE
COURT
Most private securities litigation in the federal courts involves Section
10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act (the 1934 Act),13 and Rule
10b-5,14 both of which prohibit fraud in connection with the purchase or
sale of securities.15 From its inception, courts have consistently implied
a private cause of action under Rule 10b-5.16 While Congress
occasionally legislates in the Rule 10b-5 arena, the judiciary has largely
established the elements of the implied cause of action. As set forth by
the Supreme Court in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo,17 to
establish a prima facie case under Rule 10b-5, a private plaintiff must
generally plead and prove: (1) a material misrepresentation or omission
by the defendant,18 (2) scienter,19 (3) a connection between the
13. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006). The 1934 Act confers
exclusive jurisdiction upon the federal courts to adjudicate disputes arising from the act. Id. § 27(a), 15
U.S.C. § 78aa.
14. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010).
15. Rule 10b-5, drawn from section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, provides: ―It shall be unlawful for any
person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of
the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.‖ Id. While there is robust judicial precedent interpreting Rule 10b-5(b), prohibiting material
omissions and misstatements of fact, there are very few cases directly addressing clauses (a) and (c),
sometimes cumulatively deemed ―fraud by conduct.‖ Ronald J. Colombo, Cooperation with Securities
Fraud, 61 ALA. L. REV. 61 (2009); cf. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. 552 U.S.
148, 158–60 (2008) (discussing fraud by conduct in the context of secondary actors).
16. See, e.g., Kardon v. Nat‘l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513–14 (E.D. Pa. 1946). An
overwhelming majority of lower courts adopted the Kardon holding that Rule 10b-5 included a private
right of action, a position ultimately endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1975. Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975). See also, Merrill Lynch v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 79 (citing
Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971)); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976).
17. 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005).
18. Under applicable Supreme Court precedent, ―An omitted fact is material if there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to
vote.‖ TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
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misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a security,20
(4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission,21 (5) economic
loss,22 and (6) loss causation.23
Critics of federal securities class actions argue that even meritorious
Rule 10b-5 class actions do not provide sufficient deterrence or
compensatory benefits to justify their costs.24 Conceptually, many
securities class actions involving secondary market transactions simply
impose a wealth transfer upon public shareholders, resulting in a net loss
to investors after accounting for transaction costs, including attorneys‘
fees.25 Directors and Officers (D&O) liability insurance typically
insulates malfeasant managers, leaving only the corporation and the
insurer to pay the damages.26 The offending corporation‘s value is
decreased by the amount of the award returned to the plaintiffshareholders, either directly or as a result of increased D&O insurance
premiums.27
Diversified investors are particularly disadvantaged

19. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193. To establish scienter, the plaintiff must prove the defendant
intended to ―deceive, manipulate, or defraud‖ the plaintiff. Id. Among the federal circuit courts, this
intent requirement is satisfied by knowledge and varying degrees of recklessness. Tellabs, Inc. v.
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319 n.3 (2007). In Tellabs, the Supreme Court also held
that to successfully plead scienter, ―the inference of scienter must be more than merely ‗reasonable‘ or
‗permissible‘—it must be cogent and compelling, thus strong in light of other explanations. A
complaint will survive . . . only if a reasonable person would deem the inference of scienter cogent and
at least as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from the facts alleged.‖ Id. at 324.
20. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 730–55 (acknowledging a private cause of action under Rule
10b-5 and establishing standing requirements limited to ―purchasers‖ or ―sellers‖ of securities).
21. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241–50 (1988) (affirming that reliance is a necessary
element of Rule 10b-5 private actions and establishing a rebuttable presumption of reliance based upon
the ―fraud-on-the-market‖ theory); see also Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. 552
U.S. 148, 159–66 (2008) (holding that the reliance element of Rule 10b-5 requires that investors be
aware of the defendant‘s role in the challenged transaction).
22. In Dura, the Court cites 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) as authority for the necessity of proving
economic loss, although the cited provision actually refers to loss causation. Dura Pharm., Inc., 544
U.S. at 341.
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., Jennifer J. Johnson & Edward Brunet, Critiquing Arbitration of Shareholder
Claims, 36 SEC. REG. L. J. 181, 183–85 (2008) (summarizing critiques of class action securities
litigation).
25. Id.; see also Richard A. Booth, Class Conflict in Securities Fraud Litigation (Villanova
Univ. Sch. of Law Working Paper Series, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1811768
(detailing wealth transfer issue in the context of class actions); John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the
Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534,
1549–56 (2006) (noting corporate entity rather than individual wrongdoers normally funds the
settlement); INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION 78–79 (2006),
available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee_Interim_ReportREV2.pdf (explaining
that recovery in securities class actions is circular); Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious
Liability for Fraud on Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 698–700
(arguing liability of corporate enterprise imposes costs of fraud upon innocent shareholders).
26. Coffee, supra note 25, at 1546–53.
27. Booth, supra note 25 (arguing that stock drop class action claims should instead proceed as
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because they often purchase and sell shares in the same firm at different
points in time, which can leave them sharing in the loss but ineligible to
claim any portion of the damages.28 Moreover, evidence that securities
class actions produce a deterrent effect is inconclusive.29
In an effort to curb what it deemed vexatious legislation, Congress in
1995 enacted the PSLRA.30 Among its many provisions,31 the PSLRA
imposes lead plaintiff criteria and severe procedural hurdles for Rule
10b-5 class action plaintiffs. For example, under the PSLRA, in order to
defeat a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs must, before discovery, state with
particularity facts detailing the fraud and ―giving rise to a strong
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind
(scienter).‖32
A. The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998
Congress soon confronted allegations that civil plaintiffs were
attempting to avoid the pleading and other procedural hurdles imposed
by the 1995 PSLRA by filing civil claims in state court.33 Though the
derivative suits).
28. Coffee, supra note 25, at 1556–57; see also Merritt B. Fox, Civil Liability and Mandatory
Disclosure, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 281 (2009) (―The compensation justification for a cause of action
against the issuer for a misstatement in a disclosure filing is very weak, particularly given the high
transaction costs associated with securities litigation.‖); Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities
Litigation Reform: Restructuring the Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule
10b-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1314 (2008) (―[M]ost commentators now agree that the prototypical
Rule 10b-5 class action (i.e., one brought against a nontrading corporation for its officer‘s fraud-on-themarket) cannot be defended on compensatory grounds.‖).
29. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, On Leaving Corporate Executives “Naked, Homeless and
Without Wheels”: Corporate Fraud, Equitable Remedies, and the Debate Over Entity Versus Individual
Liability, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 627 (2007) (arguing that deterrence value of enterprise liability is
slightly positive but hard to justify given its costs); Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in
Securities Class Actions, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1487, 1504 (1996) (proposing a shift from damages to civil
penalties); Jennifer Arlen & William Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities Markets:
Theories and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691; (presenting empirical evidence that enterprise liability
does not sufficiently deter fraud). Not everyone agrees that securities class actions are in need of
reform. See, e.g., James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. REV 497
(1997) (defending compensatory and deterrent values of securities class actions); Joel Seligman, The
Merits Do Matter, 108 HARV. L. REV. 438 (1994) (arguing that the rationale of the PSLRA is
unfounded).
30. PSLRA, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
31. The PSLRA provides for a stay of discovery pending a motion to dismiss, 15 U.S.C. § 78u4(b)(3)(B) (2006), 15 U.S.C § 77z-1(b)(2006); contains a statutory safe harbor, unavailable under most
state blue sky laws, for forward-looking statements, § 78-u5(c), § 77z-2; establishes lead plaintiff
criteria for class actions, § 78-u4(a)(3), § 77z-1(a)(3); and creates a system of proportionate liability,
§ 78u-4(f), § 77(k)(f)).
32. § 78-u4(b)(2)(A).
33. See Merrill Lynch v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 82 (2006) (―To stem this ‗shif[t] from Federal to
State courts‘ and ‗prevent certain State private securities class action lawsuits alleging fraud from being
used to frustrate the objectives of the Reform Act, SLUSA §§ 2(2), (5), 112 Stat. 3227, Congress
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empirical evidence of a shift to state court was inconclusive,34 in 1998,
Congress enacted SLUSA,35 which restricts most securities fraud class
actions to federal court, where they are subject to the federal
jurisprudence of Rule 10b-5, and the strict procedural requirements of
the PSLRA.36
SLUSA is a preclusion statute that prevents both state and federal
courts from adjudicating certain class actions that are based upon state
statutory or common law and that allege a misrepresentation in
connection with the purchase or sale of ―covered securities.‖37 SLUSA
defines a covered security as any security that is traded nationally and
listed on a regulated national exchange.38 The definition also includes
most senior securities of the same issuer.39 SLUSA does not apply to
securities issued by non-public companies nor does it apply to privately
placed debt securities such as mortgage bonds, even when issued by
public companies.40
SLUSA contains exceptions; notably, the ―Delaware Carve-Out‖
preserves state court jurisdiction over any otherwise ―covered class
action . . . that is based upon the statutory or common law of the state in
which the issuer is incorporated‖ when the claims involve
communications directed to shareholders in connection with their voting
rights, such as in M & A transactions.41
SLUSA applies to class actions or groups of lawsuits pending in the
same courts that raise common issues of law and fact, and when
combined, seek damages on behalf of fifty or more persons.42 SLUSA
enacted SLUSA.‖) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 105-640, at 10 (1998); S. REP. NO. 105-182, at 3–4 (1998)).
34. Compare Joseph A. Grundfest and Michael A. Perino, Securities Litigation Reform: The
First Year's Experience a Statistical and Legal Analysis of Class Action Securities Fraud Litigation
Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (John M. Olin Program in Law and
Economics, Working Paper No. 140, 1997), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=10582 (documenting
shift to state court), and Michael Perino, Fraud And Federalism: Preempting Private State Securities
Fraud Causes of Action, 50 STAN. L. REV. 273 (1998) (same), with Lisa L. Casey, Shutting the Doors to
State Court: The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, 27 SEC. REG. L.J. 141 (1999)
(providing an in-depth analysis of the competing empirical studies), and David M. Levine & Adam C.
Pritchard, The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998: The Sun Sets on California's Blue
Sky Laws, 54 BUS. LAW. 1, 1–9 (1998) (questioning whether any empirical data indicates a post PSLRA
migration by plaintiffs to state court), and Richard W. Painter, Responding to a False Alarm: Federal
Preemption of State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1998) (questioning the
justification for SLUSA).
35. SLUSA, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
36. Dabit, 547 U.S. at 82.
37. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78bb(f), 77p(b)–(f) (2006).
38. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78bb(f)(3), 77r(f)(3) (2006).
39. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p(f)(3), 77r(b). A senior security has ―priority over any other class as to the
distribution of assets or payment of dividends.‖ § 77r(d)(4).
40. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78bb(f)(5)(B), 77p(f)(3).
41. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78bb(f)(3)(A), 77p(d).
42. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78bb(f)(5)(B)(ii), 77p(f)(2). Initially, SLUSA would have prohibited all private
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does not impact individual securities claims43 unless they are part of a
series of lawsuits that ―proceed as a single action.‖44 Courts can
combine individual suits, even over the objection of the plaintiffs, if the
plaintiffs have consolidated the actions for any purpose.45 If the
combined lawsuits involve more than fifty plaintiffs, SLUSA preclusion
applies. SLUSA creates federal removal jurisdiction over covered class
actions,46 so SLUSA interpretations have primarily been the province of
the federal courts as they consider remand petitions.47
SLUSA precludes state class action claims involving
misrepresentations in connection with securities transactions even if the
state cause of action does not mirror Rule10b-5. For example, lower
courts have held that SLUSA precludes state court class actions
premised on state statutory or common law provisions that, contrary to
Rule 10b-5, do not require scienter or reliance.48 In Merrill Lynch v.
Dabit, the U.S. Supreme Court held that SLUSA precluded a class
action based upon a state law providing for liability for
misrepresentations that caused investors to ―hold‖ securities.49 The
Court found that the allegations were ―in connection with the purchase
actions in state court involving nationally traded securities. See Securities Litigation Improvement Act
of 1997, H.R. 1653, 105th Cong. (1997); see also Perino, supra note 34, at 334 (arguing that Congress
should preclude all state private actions to prevent class action plaintiffs from eluding the discovery stay
of the PSLRA by filing an individual action in state court).
43. See S. REP. NO. 105-182, at 7 (1998) (The Senate Banking Committee stated that it ―does not
intend for the bill to prevent plaintiffs from bringing bona fide individual actions simply because more
than fifty persons commence the actions in the same state court against a single defendant.‖).
44. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78bb(f)(5)(B)(ii)(II), 77p(f)(2)(A)(ii)(II) (2006); see, e.g., In re Enron Corp.
Sec., 535 F.3d 325, 339–42 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding cases filed by a single law firm involving 196
plaintiffs were ―proceed[ing] as a single action‖ under SLUSA, even though each case involved fewer
than 50 plaintiffs). Individual suits brought by state entities cannot be grouped with concurrent class
actions. §§ 78bb(F)(3)(B), 77p(d)(2).
45. 15 U.S.C.§§ 78bb(f)(5)(B)(ii)(II), 77p(f)(2)(A)(ii)(II); see, e.g., Instituto De Prevision Militar
v. Merrill Lynch, 546 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2008) (stating cases can be involuntarily combined if
plaintiffs have agreed to consolidation for discovery or any other purpose); In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec.
Litig., 308 F. Supp. 2d 236, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (noting cases consolidated for pretrial purposes
qualified as a ―group of lawsuits‖ under § 78bb(f)(5)(B)(ii)); Gordon Partners v. Blumenthal, No. 02Civ-7377, 2007 WL 431864, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2007) (same); In re Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n
Sec., Derivative, and ―ERISA‖ Litig., 503 F. Supp. 2d 25, 30–33 (D.D.C. 2007) (concluding that two
lawsuits brought by plaintiffs who opted out of a class action were ―covered class actions‖ once
consolidated with the original claim).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(2); Proctor v. Vishay Intertech. Inc., 584 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2009)
(citing § 78bb(f)(1)–(2)) (noting SLUSA creates a federal preclusion defense and it alone establishes
federal removal jurisdiction if a claim is covered under the statute).
47. In addition, federal remand decisions are not appealable. Kircher v. Putman Funds Trust,
547 U.S. 633 (2006). State courts, however, may adjudicate the propriety of a federal court remand
even if they are not often called upon to do so. Id. at 646.
48. See, e.g., Anderson v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc. 521 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir.
2008) (―Plaintiffs did not have to allege scienter or reliance for SLUSA to apply.‖); Siepel v. Bank of
Am., N.A., 526 F.3d 1122 (8th Cir. 2008).
49. 547 U.S. 71 (2006).
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or sale of securities,‖50 even though such claims could not have
proceeded under Rule 10b-5 due to the purchaser-or-seller standing
requirement imposed by Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores.51 The
Dabit Court stated that courts should broadly interpret SLUSA52 in order
to carry out the congressional intent to limit abusive class actions.53 In
the wake of Dabit, courts have liberally construed the ―in connection
with‖ element of SLUSA, and have closely examined the substance of
state complaints to prevent claimants from trying to elude preemption by
―artful pleading.‖54
B. The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA)
Even if SLUSA preclusion is not available, defendants may still
remove many securities class actions to federal court under the 2005
Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA).55 CAFA confers original federal
jurisdiction over any class action56 with at least 100 claimants, minimal
diversity,57 and an aggregate amount in controversy of at least $5
50. Id. at 89.
51. 421 U.S. 723, 738–55 (1975).
52. Dabit, 547 U.S. at 85 (―[I]t is enough that the fraud alleged ‗coincide‘ with a securities
transaction—whether by the plaintiff or by someone else.‖).
53. Id. at 82.
54. See, e.g., Brown v. Calamos, 664 F.3d 123, 129 (7th Cir. 2011) (explaining that SLUSA
preclusion applies to fiduciary claim because ―allegation of fraud would be difficult and maybe
impossible to disentangle from the charge of breach of the duty of loyalty‖); Segal v. Fifth Third Bank,
N.A., 581 F.3d 305, 310–11 (6th Cir. 2009) (―For the same reason a claimant does not have the broader
authority to disclaim the applicability of SLUSA to a complaint, he cannot avoid its application through
artful pleading that removes the covered words from the complaint but leaves in the covered
concepts.‖); City of Chattanooga v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., No. 3:09CV516(WWE), 2009 WL 5184706
(D. Conn. Dec. 22, 2009) (holding SLUSA precludes state action for breach of fiduciary duty and unjust
enrichment resulting from a misrepresentation ); Levinson v PSCC Servs., Inc., No. 3:09-CV00269(PCD), 2009 WL 5184363, at *12 (D. Conn. Dec. 23, 2009) (―Plaintiffs' claims of common law
fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and aiding and abetting conversion and statutory theft are precluded
by SLUSA because a misrepresentation or other fraudulent conduct is a necessary element of these
causes of action.‖). In Barron v. Igolnikov, No. 09 Civ. 4471(TPG), 2010 WL 882890 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
10, 2010), the court found that SLUSA precluded a class action involving the Bernie Madoff ponzi
scheme even though Madoff only purported to purchase and sell covered securities.
55. CAFA, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
56. Under CAFA, the term ―class action‖ includes mass actions, which are claims on behalf of
more than 100 persons, even if not styled as class actions. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (d)(11)(A)–(B) (2006)
(defining mass actions). Cf. Tanoh v. Dow Chem. Co., 561 F.3d 945, 952–57 (9th Cir. 2009), cert.
denied, 130 S. Ct. 187 (2009) (noting CAFA, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(iii), specifically states that a
mass action shall not include claims that are joined upon the motion of a defendant); Anwar v. Fairfield
Greenwich Ltd., 676 F. Supp. 2d 285 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (adopting holding of report and recommendation
of Magistrate that derivative suit on behalf of fund with 700 shareholders was not a mass action subject
to removal under CAFA).
57. Under CAFA, the diversity requirement is satisfied if ―any member of a class of plaintiffs is
a citizen of a State different from any defendant.‖ 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). Therefore, plaintiffs cannot
destroy diversity jurisdiction by simply choosing class representatives from the defendant‘s state or
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million.58 CAFA provides original federal jurisdiction over designated
class actions, including those based upon state law claims, and does not
entirely eliminate the class action as a means to adjudicate the state
claims.59
CAFA contains exceptions for class actions involving covered
securities as defined by SLUSA,60 for class actions that concern internal
corporate governance,61 and for claims relating to the terms or
ownership of the security itself.62 Otherwise, state antifraud claims
involving privately placed and non-traded securities, such as limited
partnership offerings or privately placed mortgage-backed securities,
appear to fall squarely within CAFA. Such claims generally cannot
proceed as class actions in state court if more than one hundred plaintiffs
are involved.
Unlike SLUSA preclusion, CAFA preemption is not absolute. For
example, the act requires federal courts to decline jurisdiction under the
―Home State Controversy Exception‖—when more than two-thirds of
the class members as well as the primary defendants are from the forum
state.63 The federal court must also decline jurisdiction under the ―Local
Controversy Exemption‖ when: (1) more than two-thirds of the putative
class members are from the forum state, (2) at least one defendant is a
citizen of the state if the class seeks significant relief from that
defendant, (3) the defendant‘s conduct constitutes a significant basis of
the class claims, (4) the principal injuries occurred in the forum state,
and (5) no similar class action have been filed against any of the same
naming and in-state defendant. A corporation is a citizen of the state of incorporation and the state
where it maintains its principal place of business. § 1332(c)(1). A corporation‘s principal place of
business is its ―nerve center‖ where ―a corporation‘s officers direct, control, and coordinate the
corporation‘s activities.‖ Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1192 (2010).
58. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). CAFA allows aggregation of the amount in controversy to reach the
$5 million dollar prerequisite. § 1332(d)(6). Also, there ―is no requirement in a class action brought
originally or on removal under CAFA that any individual plaintiff‘s claim exceed $75,000.‖ Cappuccitti
v. DirectTV, Inc., 623 F.3d 1118 (11th Cir. 2010).
59. CAFA expands federal jurisdiction over pendant state law claims as long as the class action
meets CAFA's jurisdictional requirements, regardless of whether the court would otherwise exercise
supplemental jurisdiction. Erichson, supra note 9, at 1618–19.
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(9)(A).
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(9)(B).
62. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(9)(C). In Estate of Pew v. Cardarelli, 527 F.3d 25, 31 (2d Cir. 2008),
the Second Circuit held that this third CAFA exception was limited to disputes over the meaning of the
terms of the security itself, such as the interest rate. See also Greenwich Fin. Serv. Distressed Mortgage
Fund 3 LLC v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 603 F.3d 23 (2d Cir. 2010) (dismissing appeal on grounds that
CAFA does not permit appellate review of remand orders when issue involves terms of a security).
63. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(B); see Lao v. Wickes Furniture Co., 455 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1050
(C.D. Cal. 2006). In Lao, the court held that ―Under the ‗home state controversy,‘ district courts must
decline jurisdiction where two-thirds or more of the class members and the ‗primary‘ defendants are
citizens of the state where the action was originally filed.‖ Id. (citing § 1332(d)(4)(B)). The definition
of ―primary‖ defendant has not been without controversy.
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defendants within a three-year period.64 CAFA gives discretion to the
courts to decline jurisdiction in the interest of justice, looking at the
―totality of the circumstances,‖ when between one-third and two-thirds
of the plaintiffs reside in the same state as the defendant.65
C. Class Actions Alleging 1933 Act Claims
State class action filings alleging violations of the 1933 Act66 have
presented problematic interpretations under both SLUSA and CAFA.
The 1933 Act imposes liability for misrepresentations in connection
with public offerings of securities.67 Section 22 of the 1933 Act itself
provides for concurrent jurisdiction between state courts and federal
district courts.68 Originally, Section 22(a) of the 1933 Act specifically
provided that no case ―brought in any state court of competent
jurisdiction shall be removed to any court of the United States.‖69
1. The Impact of SLUSA on 1933 Act Claims
In 1998, Congress amended Section 22 of the 1933 Act to allow
removal pursuant to SLUSA.70 Ordinarily, a public offering of
securities under the 1933 Act results in nationally listed and traded
64. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(a). The terms ―significant basis‖ and ―significant relief‖ have been
the subject of litigation. See, e.g., Graphic Commc‘ns Local 1B Health & Welfare Fund A v. CVS
Caremark Corp., 725 F. Supp. 2d 849, 854–55 (D. Minn. 2010). In CVS Caremark, the court wrote,
―Significant relief‖ is ―a significant portion of the entire relief sought by the class,‖ and the ―significant
basis‖ provision requires a comparison of ―the local defendant‘s alleged conduct to the alleged conduct
of all the defendants.‖ Id. (quoting Evans v. Walter Indus., Inc., 449 F.3d 1159, 1167 (11th Cir.2006),
Kaufman v. Allstate New Jersey Ins. Co., 561 F.3d 144, 156 (3d Cir.2009)).
65. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3). In exercising this discretion, the court must consider: ―whether the
claims asserted involve matters of national or interstate interest; whether the claims asserted will be
governed by laws of the State in which the action was originally filed or by the laws of other States;
whether the class action has been pleaded in a manner that seeks to avoid Federal jurisdiction; whether
the action was brought in a forum with a distinct nexus with the class members, the alleged harm, or the
defendants; whether the number of citizens of the State in which the action was originally filed in all
proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate is substantially larger than the number of citizens from any
other State, and the citizenship of the other members of the proposed class is dispersed among a
substantial number of States; and whether, during the 3-year period preceding the filing of that class
action, 1 or more other class actions asserting the same or similar claims on behalf of the same or other
persons have been filed.‖ Id.
66. Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2006).
67. Securities Act of 1933 Act § 12(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2) (2006); 1933 Act § 11, 15
U.S.C. § 77k (2006). Section 12(a)(1) of the 1933 Act also provides a rescission remedy to purchasers
when the seller has violated section 5 of the 1933 Act, which requires securities to be either exempt or
registered. Such claims, however, do not involve misrepresentations and therefore would not fall within
SLUSA‘s preclusion. 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(1).
68. Securities Act of 1933 Act § 22, 15 U.S.C. § 77v (2006).
69. Id. § 22(a).
70. Securities Act of 1933 Act § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77p(c) (2006).
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securities that would fall within SLUSA‘s definition of covered
securities. Arguably, therefore, any resulting state court class action
claims would be subject to removal under SLUSA. Some federal
district courts, however, citing the statutory text of SLUSA, have held
that state court class actions asserting only 1933 Act claims may not be
removed under SLUSA. These courts reason that SLUSA defines a
covered class action as one ―based upon the statutory or common law of
any State or subdivision thereof,‖ and containing specified allegations in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security.71 Claims based upon
the 1933 Act, however, are federal law claims not arising under the
―statutory or common law of any State.‖ Therefore, under a literal
reading of SLUSA‘s terms, its removal provisions do not apply.72
Conversely, some courts have interpreted SLUSA to authorize or
require removal of 1933 Act class actions to federal court. One
proffered theory is that quite apart from its removal provisions, SLUSA
stripped state courts of subject matter jurisdiction over covered class
actions raising 1933 Act claims, leaving federal courts with sole subject
matter jurisdiction over these class actions.73 Another theory suggests
that the SLUSA removal provisions, properly understood, trump the
Section 22 anti-removal statute even when the class action complaint is
solely grounded on federal 1933 Act claims.74
71. Id.
72. Federal Courts adopting this view include: Unschuld v. Tri-S Sec. Corp., No. 06 Civ. 2931JEC, 2007 WL 2729011 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 14, 2007) (granting remand); Irra v. Lazard Ltd., No. 05 CV
3388RJDRML, 2006 WL 2375472 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2006) (same); Pipefitters Local 522 & 633
Pension Trust Fund v. Salem Commc‘ns Corp., No. CV 05-2730-RGK, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14202
(C.D. Cal. June 28, 2005) (same); In re Tyco Int‘l, Ltd., 322 F. Supp. 2d 116 (D.N.H. 2004) (same);
Nauheim v. Interpublic Grp. of Co., No. 02-C9211, 2003 WL 1888843 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 16, 2003) (same);
Haw. Structural Ironworkers Pension Trust Fund v. Calpine Corp., No. 03-cv-0714-BTM (JFS), 2003
WL 23509312 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2003) (same); In re Waste Mgmt., Inc. Sec. Litig., 194 F. Supp. 2d
590 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (same). Contra Rubin v. Pixelplus Co., Ltd., No. 06-CV-2964(ERK), 2007 WL
778485 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2007) (denying remand); Pinto v. Vonage Holdings Corp., No. 07-0062
(FLW), 2007 WL 1381746 (D.N.J. May 7, 2007) (same); Rovner v. Vonage Holdings Corp., No. 07178 (FLW), 2007 WL 446658 (D.N.J. Feb. 7, 2007) (same); Lowinger v. Johnston, No. 3:05-CV-316-H,
2005 WL 2592229 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 13, 2005) (same); In re King Pharms., Inc., 230 F.R.D. 503, 505
(E.D. Tenn. 2004) (same); Kulinski v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., No. Civ.A.C-2-03-412, 2003 WL
24032299 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 19, 2003) (same); Brody v. Homestore, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 1122 (C.D.
Cal. 2003) (same); Alkow v. TXU Corp., Nos. 3:02CV2738K, 3:02 CV 2739 K, 2003 WL 21056750
(N.D. Tex. May 8, 2003) (same).
73. See, e.g., Knox v. Agria Corp., 613 F. Supp. 2d 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). Accord Michael Serot,
(Mis)Interpreting SLUSA: Closing the Jurisdictional Loophole in Federal Securities Class Actions, 7
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 162 (2010).
74. Courts adopting this view include: Rubin, No. 06-CV-2964(ERK), 2007 WL 778485
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2007) (denying remand); Pinto, No. 07-0062 (FLW), 2007 WL 1381746 (D.N.J.
May 7, 2007) (same); Rovner, No. 07-178 (FLW), 2007 WL 446658 (D.N.J. Feb. 7, 2007) (same);
Lowinger, No. 3:05-CV-316-H, 2005 WL 2592229 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 13, 2005) (same); In re King
Pharmaceuticals., Inc., 230 F.R.D. 503, 505 (E.D. Tenn. 2004) (same); Kulinski, No. Civ.A.C-2-03-412,
2003 WL 24032299 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 19, 2003) (same); Brody, 240 F. Supp. 2d 1122 (C.D. Cal. 2003)
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These various rulings by federal district courts are not as of yet
constrained by federal appellate opinions because SLUSA did not
amend the general prohibition on interlocutory appeals of remand
decisions.75 Therefore, different federal judges, sometimes even in the
same court, have reached differing conclusions on the viability of 1933
Act class action suits in state courts in the aftermath of SLUSA. 76
2. The Impact of CAFA on 1933 Act Claims
CAFA does not impact 1933 Act claims involving nationally-traded
securities defined under SLUSA as covered securities.77 For noncovered securities, courts face conflicting statutory provisions: CAFA,
requiring removal under most circumstances, and Section 22 of the 1933
Act, forbidding removal. Currently, circuit courts disagree on the
relationship between CAFA and Section 22 of the 1933 Act.78 The
Ninth Circuit, relying upon the canon of statutory construction that the
more specific statute controls the general statute, held that 1933 Act
claims are not removable under CAFA.79 The Seventh Circuit rejected
the Ninth Circuit‘s analysis of statutory canons, finding that Section
22(a) of the 1933 Act was not a subset of CAFA, and therefore was not
the more specific statute.80 On the merits, the Seventh Circuit reached
the opposite conclusion, finding upon the basis of the statutory language

(same); Alkow, Nos. 3:02CV2738K, 3:02 CV 2739 K, 2003 WL 21056750 (N.D. Tex. May 8, 2003)
(same).
75. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d); see Kircher v. Putnam Trust Funds, 547 U.S. 633, 640 (2006). In
Kircher, the court held that ―An ‗order remanding or declining to remand a case to the State court from
which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise.‘‖ Id. (quoting § 1447(d) in a postSLUSA Supreme Court opinion).
76. For example, in the Eastern District of New York, some judges take the broad approach to
interpreting the SLUSA and refuse to remand 1933 Act class actions, while others take the narrow
approach and remand the cases to state court. Compare Irra, No. 05 CV 3388 RJDRML, 2006 WL
2375472 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2006) (granting remand), with Rubin, No. 06-CV-2964(ERK), 2007 WL
778485 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2007) (denying remand). In Luther v. Countrywide Financial Corp., No.
B222889, 2011 WL 1879242 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. May 18, 2011), a California Appellate Court held that
1933 Act class action claims can proceed in state court if they involve non-covered securities under
SLUSA.
77. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(9)(A) (2006).
78. Unlike SLUSA, CAFA specifically provides that remand decisions are appealable under the
discretion of the appellate court. Compare SLUSA, 15 U.S.C. § 77p(d)(4), with CAFA, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1453(c)(1) (2006).
79. Luther v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP, 533 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting
§ 11 action was not removable because § 22 of the 1933 Act is the more specific statute and trumps
CAFA). Ironically, upon remand, the state court found that SLUSA deprived the state court of
jurisdiction and dismissed the proceeding, a decision that itself was subsequently reversed. Luther v.
Countrywide Financial Corp., No. B222889, 2011 WL 1879242 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. May 18, 2011).
80. Katz v. Gerardi, 552 F.3d 558, 561–62 (7th Cir. 2009).
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that CAFA permitted removal of 1933 Act claims.81 This split
obviously provides some opportunities for forum shopping if a plaintiff
desires to keep a Section 11 case in state court.82
D. The Remaining Space for State Securities Class Actions
Together, SLUSA and CAFA relegate state securities class actions
primarily to (1)claims involving corporate governance, or M & A
transactions that are based upon the law of the defendant‘s state of
incorporation; (2) class actions involving securities that are not
nationally traded when the controversy is ―local‖; (3) smaller class
actions where the plaintiff class does not exceed fifty in the case of
SLUSA covered securities, or one hundred in the case of non-covered
securities; and (4) perhaps class actions solely premised on claims under
the 1933 Act.
III. THE DATA SET—SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS IN STATE
COURTS (1996–2010)
A. Overview of the Data
The data in this Paper is comprised primarily of state securities class
action filings identified by Securities Class Action Services (SCAS)
from 1996 through 2010.83 SCAS maintains a proprietary database to
serve its institutional investor clients who participate in class action
filings or settlements. This database draws primarily from state courts
that maintain electronic, searchable data on class action filings, 84 and
81. Id. at 562–63 (expressly disagreeing with Luther and holding that securities class actions
alleging 1933 Act claims are removable under CAFA unless they fall within a statutory exception); see
also N.J. Carpenters Vacation Fund v. HarborView Mortg. Loan Trust 2006-4, 581 F. Supp. 2d 581
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting Congressional intent and the rule of recency mandate that removal power under
CAFA supersedes section 22(a)). For support of the HarborView position, see Laura L. Arp, New
Jersey Carpenters Vacation Fund v. Harborview Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-4, Resolving Irreconcilable
Conflicts, 88 NEB. L. REV. 853 (2010).
82. But see Pub. Emp. Ret. Sys. v. Stanley, 605 F. Supp. 2d 1073 (C.D. Cal. 2009), where the
federal district court judge in California, before ruling on the remand motion (which under Ninth Circuit
precedent the court would probably grant), transferred the case to the federal district court in New York,
where the plaintiff had commenced another cause of action. Under HarborView, the applicable
precedent in the New York district court, the remand motion would likely fail.
83. Risk Metric Group/Securities Class Action Services is a division of Institutional Shareholder
Services (ISS) that provides a range of services relating to risk management, corporate governance, and
financial research and analysis for their institutional investor clients. Securities Class Action Services,
ISS, http://www.issgovernance.com/scas (last visited Apr. 28, 2012) (―SCAS offers complete research
and analysis on all federal, state and SEC settlements, with the industry's most comprehensive database
on securities class action litigation.‖).
84. SCAS reports that the following state jurisdictions maintain searchable class action filing
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from SEC filings for public companies.85 Given Delaware‘s dominance
in corporate charters for public companies,86 the use of SEC filings as a
primary source of data may tend to over represent Delaware
corporations in the sample.87 SCAS augments its data with (1) available
published judicial orders and opinions,88 (2) published news reports and
law firm web announcements, and (3) information it receives from
attorneys and others interested in the database. I augmented the SCAS
dataset using reported federal remand decisions. Also, I augmented the
database by correlating federal securities class action filings with their
state court counterparts.89
This database is necessarily incomplete and omits some cases filed in
courts that do not maintain electric filing data systems. It also omits
cases in jurisdictions where trial courts do not ordinarily produce
judicial opinions or other public announcements concerning the cases.
While the database is fairly comprehensive regarding complaints filed
against public companies,90 there is currently no feasible way to reliably
data bases: California: Santa Clara County, Santa Barbara County, Contra Costa County; Oklahoma:
Tulsa County; Texas, Dallas County; and Arizona, Maricopa County.
85. SEC disclosure rules require companies to ―describe briefly any material pending legal
proceeding‖ in their disclosure documents. See Item 103 Legal Proceedings, Regulation SK, 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.103 (2011). Class action filings would ordinarily be deemed ―material‖ under the test of TSC
Indus., Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438 (1976), in that ―there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
shareholder would consider it important‖ in making an investment decision. Id. at 449. Therefore, the
SCAS review of SEC disclosure documents, including reports filed on Forms 10K, 10q, 8k, as well as
filings specific to M & A transactions, should reveal almost all class action filings against public
companies.
86. Delaware remains the chosen home of 63% of Fortune 500 companies and in 2010, 76% of
all new U.S. Initial Public Offerings (IPOs). DELAWARE DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS, 2010 ANNUAL
REPORT (2011), available at http://corp.delaware.gov/10CorpAR.pdf.
87. This will not necessarily impact the jurisdiction in which the class action complaint is filed.
See infra notes 121 & 124 and accompanying text and Figure 11.
88. Given that the vast majority of securities class actions settle, the most useful judicial
opinions and orders will necessarily consist of preliminary trial court orders. Unfortunately, from the
perspective of researching state court proceedings, very few state trial courts outside of Delaware, New
York, and California consistently publish orders or opinions. Indeed, only a very small percentage of
federal trial courts issue published opinions. See David A. Hoffman, Alan J. Izenman & Jeffrey R.
Lidicker, Docketology, District Courts, and Doctrine, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 681, 710 (2007) (―Overall,
of the 5,736 judicial actions we recorded, only 178—3%—came accompanied by opinions.‖).
Augmenting this class action filing data with other sources of class action filings reduces this selection
bias. See David Hoffman & Christina Boyd, Disputing Limited Liability, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 853, 856
(2010) (noting analysis of these complaints and dockets advances a ―new and robust form of legal
realism‖); Pauline T. Kim et al., How Should We Study District Court Decision-Making?, 29 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL‘Y 83, 103 (2009) (viewing case documents helps to avoid ―the problems of selection bias
introduced by relying only on opinions or published opinions‖).
89. SCAS as well as other organizations such as the Stanford Securities Class Action Clearing
House track federal securities class action filings. The federal courts maintain a searchable database for
class action filings, making this data more reliable. Nonetheless, different researchers analyze the data
quite differently. See infra note 95.
90. One study, however, suggests that the SCAS database underreports M & A objection suits

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol80/iss2/4

14

Johnson: SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS IN STATE COURT

2011]

SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS IN STATE COURT

363

track state court class action filings against private company defendants
that do not file SEC reports.91 Still, there is reason to believe that, given
the nature of securities class actions, most suits will target public
companies,92 and omitted data from private company cases will be
largely insignificant.93
SCAS codes it data in several ways, including categories of
allegations. Upon review, however, I found the coding to be incomplete
and, in some cases, inaccurate.
Therefore, I reviewed the complaints, settlement documents and other
available material to recode the data. In studying the nature of the
allegations, the vast majority of state securities class actions fell into one
of three general categories: (1) M & A objection suits; (2) 1933 Act
claims (§ 11 and § 12); or (3) ―other.‖ The nature of the allegations in
the ―other‖ category primarily includes fraud allegations with respect to
non-nationally-traded securities, claims against broker or dealers or
brokers and dealers, and breach of fiduciary duty claims apart from
M&A transactions.
This Paper tracks class actions in state court relating to the purchase,
sale, or ownership of securities, including fiduciary duty claims arising
from M & A transactions.94 The data counts all securities class action
complaints filed in a particular state jurisdiction regardless of the
ultimate disposition of the case.95 Complaints consolidated in a single
even within its own search criteria. See C.N.V. Krishnan et al., Litigation in Mergers and Acquisitions
(Vanderbilt
Law
& Econ., Research
Paper
No.
10-37, 2011),
available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1722227 (finding 127 state M & A class actions
filings in 1999, and 114 in 2000). The authors derived these 1999–2000 statistics from all filings in the
Delaware Chancery court involving M & A transactions during 1999 and 2000. To access data from
cases filed in non-Delaware state courts, the authors examined SEC filings for companies involved in
announced M & A transactions. In comparison, the SCAS reports 59 M & A cases for 1999 and 88 for
2000. While the difference may be attributable in part to different methods of counting the complaints,
it serves to highlight the difficulty in capturing accurate data for class actions filed in state court.
91. This difficulty has led most researchers to concentrate their studies upon federal courts,
public companies, or a single jurisdiction. See, e.g., Neil Marchand, Where‟s the Party, Do Class Action
Plaintiffs Really Prefer State Court? (Jan. 6, 2009) (unpublished paper), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1334923 (tracking state class actions in Michigan).
92. For example, in a study of M & A class action lawsuits brought in Delaware courts in 1999
and 2000, the authors found that 99% involved public companies, a number undoubtedly inflated by the
ratio of public companies to private companies in Delaware and the focus on M & A activity. Robert B.
Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class
Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133 (2004). The findings are telling nonetheless.
93. See Marchand, supra note 91. Utilizing the Westlaw docket database, the author tracked
class action filings in three Michigan counties from 2000–2007. The author found just two securities
class actions that were not represented in the SCAS database. Id.
94. This Paper includes a dataset that is different from that used by other research groups. For
example, the Stanford Securities Class Action Clearing House and NERA Economic Consulting track
only (or at least primarily) federal securities class actions.
95. When reviewing reports involving class action filings, it is important to know what counting
method the research firm employs. For example, Cornerstone Research issues quarterly and annual
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jurisdiction are counted as one action. The rationale for tracking filings
over this fifteen-year period is that the complaints demonstrate
jurisdictional choices made by plaintiffs‘ counsel, and should measure
the impact of congressional preclusion and preemption measures upon
those choices.

reports analyzing federal securities class actions. Utilizing data on federal class actions provided by the
Stanford Securities Class Action Clearing House, Cornerstone counts multiple filings against the same
defendants as a single filing. See, e.g., CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS:
2010
YEAR
IN
REVIEW
(2010),
available
at
http://securities.stanford.edu/clearinghouse_research/2010_YIR/Cornerstone_Research_Filings_2010_Y
IR.pdf. In contrast, NERA Economic Consulting, utilizing SCAS federal class action data along with
other unique sources of filing information, counts different complaints against the same company in
different jurisdictions as separate lawsuits (at least until the complaints are consolidated). See DR.
JORDAN MILEV, ROBERT PATTON & SVETLANA STARYKH, TRENDS 2010 YEAR-END UPDATE:
SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS ACCELERATE IN SECOND HALF OF 2010; MEDIAN SETTLEMENT
VALUE
AT
AN
ALL-TIME
HIGH
(2010),
available
at
http://www.nera.com/nerafiles/PUB_Year_End_Trends_1210.pdf. Advisen, an advisor to D & O Insurance companies, maintains
its own proprietary database of class action filings. In its reports analyzing the data, Advisen counts
each company for which securities violations are alleged in a single complaint as a separate suit and
includes regulatory actions. See, e.g., ADVISEN, 2010 A RECORD YEAR FOR SECURITIES LITIGATION
(2010), available at https://www.advisen.com/downloads/sec_lit_Q42010_report.pdf.
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B. The Results
1. The Increasing Number of State Court Securities Class Actions
Figure 1
State Securities Class Actions: 1996-2010
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As Figure 1 shows, the level of class action securities lawsuits filed in
state court remained relatively constant from 1996 until 2005, when
there was a demonstrable increase in the number of filings from an
annual average well under one hundred filings per year to the 2005 total
of 272.
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Figure 2
State Securities Class Actions 1996-2010
Compared to Federal Class Action Filings*
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* Federal filing data courtesy of NERA

Figure 2 compares state securities class action filings to federal filings
during the same time periods. This comparison helps control for
adverse economic events, such as the dot-com bust circa 2000 or the
credit crisis circa 2008, which tend to increase securities class action
filings generally. Conversely, the comparison also controls for general
positive market conditions, such as the overall market rise from 2002–
2008, which resulted in fewer securities class actions. Figure 2 shows
that the relative percentage of state securities class action filings to
federal filings began to rise dramatically in 2005, and by 2010 the
number of securities class action filings in state court outnumbered
federal filings.96

96. Given the relative accuracy of the data tracking the number of federal filings as compared to
data tracking equivalent state filings, which undoubtedly omits some claims, it is likely that the actual
number of state class actions exceeds federal filings by a greater number than depicted in Figure 2.
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Figure 3
State Securities Class Actions by State
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Figure 3 demonstrates that the largest number of state securities class
action filings occur in Delaware, followed by California, New York, and
Texas.97 This finding is not particularly surprising given the number of
companies incorporated, headquartered, or at least doing business in
these four states.98 Usually, defendants in securities class actions
include the entity itself; selected members of the board of directors; and
designated corporate officers. In general terms, a state court has
personal jurisdiction over a corporation, and its directors and officers, if
the entity is incorporated in the state or maintains its principle place of
business in the state.99 On the other hand, these states may be slightly
97. These findings are consistent with a 2010–2011 study of M & A litigation for transactions
valued at over $100 million. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SHAREHOLDER
LITIGATION
INVOLVING
MERGERS
AND
ACQUISITION
7
(2012),
available
at
http://www.cornerstone.com/files/News/d7e418ea-eb2c-4a17-8eaede2510d9d1ba/Presentation/NewsAttachment/8b664075-ebfb-4cce-aa768a050befad03/Cornerstone_Research_Shareholder_MandA_Litigation.pdf.
98. More than half of publicly traded companies and more than half of the Fortune 500
companies are incorporated in Delaware. Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or
Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Competition Over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 578
(2002). The top three states in terms of number of Fortune 500 companies headquartered in the state are
California, Texas, and New York. Annual Ranking of America‟s Largest Corporations, FORTUNE (Oct.
10, 2011), http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/2011/.
99. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114(b) (2011). Also under the Due Process Clause of
the U.S. Constitution, state courts can assert jurisdiction only over defendants who have the requisite
minimum contacts with the forum state. Although personal jurisdiction typically extends to any
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overrepresented in the data, given SCAS‘s relative ability to track filings
in Texas and California, and the more readily available state trial court
opinions in Delaware, California, and New York.100

corporation incorporated within the state or maintaining its principal place of business within the state,
―long-arm‖ statutes greatly expand personal jurisdiction to any corporation doing business with the
state. See, e.g., TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 17.042 (West 2011) (―[A] nonresident does business in
[Texas] if the nonresident: (1) contracts by mail or otherwise with a Texas resident and either party is to
perform the contract in whole or in part in this state; (2) commits a tort in whole or in part in this state;
or (3) recruits Texas residents, directly or through an intermediary located in [Texas], for employment
inside or outside th[e] state.‖).
100. Other state courts that witnessed significant securities class action activity from 1996–2010
include Florida with 46 filings; New Jersey with 42 filings and Illinois with 41 filings.
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Figure 4
Delaware Securities Class Action Filings: 1996–2010
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Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the securities class action complaints filed in
state court in Delaware and California, the states with the largest number
of filings.
Figure 4 details the securities class actions filed in the Delaware
Chancery Court from 1996–2010. The number of securities class action
filings in Delaware remained relatively constant until 2000, two years
after the enactment of SLUSA, when filings more than doubled from the
previous year. In 2001, the number of Delaware class action filings
retreated to pre-1995 (PSLRA) levels before rising to a record number
of filings in 2010. Interestingly, while the number of Delaware
securities class actions has increased, the relative percentage of
Delaware cases compared to those in other jurisdictions has fallen.101

101. See infra notes 127–130 and accompanying text.
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Figure 5
California Securities Class Action Filings: 1996–2010
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In 1996 and 1997, in the immediate aftermath of the PSLRA,
plaintiffs‘ counsel filed several securities class actions in California state
courts. This activity provided ammunition for those arguing that
plaintiffs‘ attorneys were bringing their securities cases in state court to
avoid the procedural hurdles mandated by Congress in 1995.102 At that
time, the California courts appeared to recognize broad civil liability in
connection with secondary market transactions that comprise the vast
majority of stock drop class actions.103 Moreover, in 1996 California
voters were considering a ballot measure to further extend civil liability
in securities cases.104 Lobbying efforts by California- based issuers
prompted Congress to enact SLUSA in 1998.105
102. The existence of the state court end run to avoid the mandates of the PSLRA is now
enshrined in judicial opinions including those of the U.S. Supreme Court. See Merrill Lynch v. Dabit,
547 U.S. 71, 81–82 (2006); see also supra note 33. Among scholars, the empirical justification for
SLUSA is debatable. See supra note 34.
103. See Levine & Pritchard, supra note 34 (detailing the securities litigation climate in California
in 1996 and 1997).
104. Id. (explaining California Prop. 211). Ultimately, the California voters defeated the ballot
measure. See Bob Davis & G. Paschal Zachary, Election „96: Affirmative Action, Shareholder Lawsuits
and Tax Increases Are Rejected By Voters, WALL ST. J., Nov. 7, 1996, at A17. Also, the California
Court of Appeals limited liability in stock drop cases to defendants who were purchasers or sellers (or
offerors) of the securities. Murphy v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770, 784 (Cal. Ct. App.
2003).
105. High-tech companies located in Silicon Valley led the lobbying effort. Leslie Eaton, The
Silicon Valley Gang; An Influential Industry With Lots of Money Is Getting Its Way on Capitol Hill,
N.Y.TIMES, June 11, 1998, at D1; see, e.g., Michael Perino, Fraud and Federalism: Preempting Private
State Securities Causes of Action, 50 STAN L. REV. 273 (1998) (providing empirical evidence of a shift
of securities class actions to state court as plaintiffs seek to avoid the procedural hurdles of the PLRSA).
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2. Allegations in State Securities Class Action Complaints
a. Merger and Acquisition (M & A) Transactions
Figure 6
Composition of State Court Class Action Filings:
M & A vs All Other
1996-2010
Number of Claims Filed

300
250
200
150
M&A

100

Other

50
2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

0

Year

With the exception of 1996, the vast majority of state securities class
action filings from 1996–2010 involved M&A cases in which
shareholders challenged some facet of a corporate acquisition.106 These
class action complaints usually allege that the transaction price offered
to shareholders is too low or, in the case of hostile acquisitions, that the
target board is unfairly preventing the shareholders from selling their
shares at a premium.107 In state court, the allegations are usually styled
as a breach of fiduciary duty, or claims that the defendant company
provided inaccurate or misleading information to the shareholders.
Almost all of these M&A cases involve public companies with
106. These figures do not include state court derivative suits, which are expressly exempted from
SLUSA. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(f)(2)(B) (2006). Thompson and Thomas found that of the cases filed in
Delaware courts in 1999 and 2000 alleging a fiduciary duty breach in connection with an acquisition
transaction, 94% were styled as class actions rather than derivative suits. Thompson & Thomas, supra
note 92, at 167–69. However, a more recent study of derivate suits filed in 2005 and 2006 found that
many derivative suits were in fact filed in federal, where they perhaps escaped notice by other authors.
Jessica M. Erickson, Corporate Governance in the Courtroom: an Empirical Analysis, 51 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1749, 1762 (2010).
107. Thompson and Thomas found that the vast majority (88%) of M & A class actions were
shareholder lawsuits alleging a fiduciary duty breach resulting from an agreement to sell the company
for too low of a price. Thompson & Thomas, supra note 92. The remaining 12 % of the lawsuits
involved complaints by bidders or targets. Id.; see also Krishnan et al., supra note 90.
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nationally traded securities defined as covered securities under SLUSA.
108
SLUSA, however, exempts M&A class actions from its preclusive
provisions. In a provision known as the ―Delaware Carve-Out,‖ SLUSA
exempts from its coverage any otherwise ―covered class action . . . that
is based upon the statutory or common law of the State in which the
issuer is incorporated‖ under specified circumstances including M&A
transactions.109

108. While these M & A transactions involve ―covered securities,‖ there may be a question
whether some of these controversies involve misrepresentations in connection with the purchase or sale
of a security as contemplated by SLUSA. The existence of the Delaware Carve-Out makes it
unnecessary to address this issue.
109. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78bb(f)(3)(A)(i)–(ii), 77p(d)(1)(A)–(B) (2006) (providing that SLUSA
preclusion does not apply to a class action ―that is based upon the statutory or common law of the State
in which the issuer is incorporated (in the case of a corporation) or organized (in the case of any other
entity) may be maintained in a State or Federal court by a private party . . . if it involves . . . the purchase
or sale of securities by the issuer or an affiliate of the issuer exclusively from or to holders of equity
securities of the issuer, or any recommendation, position, or other communication with respect to the
sale of securities of the issuer that—is made by or on behalf of the issuer or an affiliate of the issuer to
holders of equity securities of the issuer; and concerns decisions of those equity holders with respect to
voting their securities, acting in response to a tender or exchange offer, or exercising dissenters‘ or
appraisal rights.‖). CAFA also excepts from its preemptive scope these M&A cases involving covered
securities, as defined in SLUSA. CAFA, 28 U.S.C. § 1453(d)(1) (2006).
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Number of Claims Filed

Figure 7
Federal Court vs State Court M&A Filings
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Figure 7 compares the number of M&A class actions filed in state
court with those filed in federal court.110
Allegations of
misrepresentations in connection with M&A transactions are actionable
under Section 14 of the 1934 Act,111 where jurisdiction remains
exclusively within the federal courts.112 In the last decade, however,
state courts have been the forums of choice to redress these grievances,
and even the majority of M&A cases filed in federal courts are diversity
cases alleging state law fiduciary duty breaches.

110. The federal filing data is provided courtesy of Luke Green at SCAS.
111. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a), (e) (2006).
112. Id. § 78aa(a).
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Figure 8
Filings by State of Incorporation (2010)
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Figure 8 demonstrates that increasingly, plaintiffs‘ attorneys are
choosing to file cases in multiple jurisdictions and often outside of the
defendant‘s state of incorporation. For example, of the 2010 M & A
class action state court filings against Delaware corporations,
approximately 18% were single, out-of-state filings; 23% were
Delaware-only filings; and 58% were multiple filings where plaintiffs
sued both in Delaware and out of state.113 Larger M & A transactions
generate a correspondingly larger number of filings. Cornerstone
Research reports that in 2010 and 2011, litigation occurred in 91% of M
& A deals valued at over $100 million with an average of 5.1 lawsuits
per deal.114
This data is consistent with a 2011 study of Leverage Buyouts
(LBOs), a subset of merger and acquisition transactions, which found a
drop in filings in the Delaware courts, even for entities incorporated in
Delaware.115 Armour, Black, and Cheffins‘s report that in 2000, 76% of
LBO cases involving Delaware companies were filed in Delaware
courts. Between 2003 and 2005, the number of Delaware filings
dropped to 60%, and from 2006 forward, plaintiffs brought a majority of
LBO cases involving Delaware corporations in other—almost
113. Similarly, for M& A transactions involving Delaware targets with value of at least $100
million, only a small number of claims were filed solely in the Delaware Chancery Court.
CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 97, at 6.
114. The very largest transactions during 2010 and 2011 generated 15–29 lawsuits each. Id.
Unlike the SCAS data, the Cornerstone Research Report includes derivative suits. In another study of
derivative suits filed in federal court during a 12-month period in 2005–2006, the author found 39 suits
alleging violation of section 14(a) of the 1934 Act, thus indicating an M & A objection suit. Erickson,
supra note 106, at 1762. Over half of federal derivative suits in the study were accompanied by at least
one parallel state court derivative suit. Id. at 1827.
115. John Armour, Bernard S. Black & Brian R. Cheffins, Is Delaware Losing its Cases?
(University of Cambridge Faculty Law, Research Paper No. 11/08, 2011), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1578404.
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exclusively state—courts.116 Legislative history suggests that at least
some in Congress intended that SLUSA exempt only M & A class
action complaints filed in the court of the defendant‘s state of
incorporation.117 The text of SLUSA, however, is not so limited. On its
face the carve-out requires only that allegations are based upon the law
of the state of incorporation.118 Consistent with SLUSA‘s statutory text,
courts have unanimously concluded that cases alleging violations under
the laws of the state of incorporation can be brought in any state court
having jurisdiction over the defendants.119

116. Id. at 18–22. In a follow up article, Armour, Black, and Cheffins reported similar results for
mega M & A transactions. John Armour, Bernard Black & Brian Cheffins, Delaware‟s Balancing Act
(Univ. of Cambridge Faculty of Law, Research Paper No. 37, 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1677400; see also Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, A Great Game:
The Dynamics of State Competition and Litigation(Apr. 1, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1984758 (finding in a study of M & A deals
completed between 2005 and 2010 and valued at over $100 million ―that Delaware is relatively
unresponsive to attorneys who leave the jurisdiction in pursuit of more favorable fee awards‖ and that
Delaware may indeed be losing cases to other jurisdictions).
117. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 105-803, at 13–14 & n.2 (1998) (Conf. Rep.) (―It is the intention of
the managers that the suits under this exception be limited to the state in which the issuer of the security
is incorporated.‖). Similar statements appeared in an earlier Senate Banking Committee Report: ―[T]he
Committee expressly does not intend for suits excepted under this provision to be brought in venues
other than the issuer's state or incorporation.‖ S. REP. NO.105-182, at 6 (1998).
118. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(d)(1) (2006).
119. See, e.g., Huang v. Reyes, No. C 07-5950 CRB, 2008 WL 648519 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (noting
under plain text of SLUSA plaintiff need not bring suit only in state court of defendant‘s state of
incorporation to fall within ―Delaware Carve-Out‖); Gibson v. PS Grp. Holdings, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
90,921 (S.D. Cal. 2000) (―Nothing in [SLUSA‘s] language suggests that Congress intended to restrict
the venue of preserved class actions to the issuer‘s state of incorporation.‖); see also Davis v. Mich.
Dep‘t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 808 n.3 (1989) (―Legislative history is irrelevant to the interpretation
of an unambiguous statute.‖).
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b. IPO Claims: Sections 11 & 12 of the 1933 Act
Figure 9
IPO-related State Court § 11 Filings: 1996–
2010
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Figure 10
§11 Claims in State Court v Federal Court
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Earlier, this Paper reviewed the controversy surrounding the
appropriate relationship between Section 11 IPO claims under the 1933
Act, the preclusive provisions of SLUSA, and the preemptive provisions
of CAFA. Figures 9 and 10 indicate that despite the alarm bells
sounding in some quarters, and the many scholarly articles addressing
this issue, plaintiffs rarely pursue IPO claims in state court. Since the
enactment of CAFA in 2005, plaintiffs have filed very few Section 11
claims in state court, preferring the federal forum by a wide margin.
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c. The “Other” Category
Figure 11
"Other" Claims v IPO and M & A Allegations
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Figure 11 indicates that plaintiffs pursue relatively few class actions
in state court outside of the M & A arena. Allegations in state class
actions not involving
M & A or IPO cases arise from a wide array of misrepresentations
with respect to non-traded securities, including Ponzi schemes, private
placement offering fraud, suits against brokers, and breach of fiduciary
duty claims apart from M & A transactions. There is little doubt that
cases in this category are undercounted in the data due to tracing
difficulties.120

120. For example, in Oregon, an alleged Ponzi scheme involving the SunWest corporation
resulted in two class actions in Oregon courts against the promoter and various secondary defendants yet
the SCAS database features neither claim. While the plaintiff classes far exceeded one hundred
investors, these state actions involved non-covered securities, and did not fall under CAFA due to the
local controversy exemption.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF STATE CLASS ACTION DATA
There are few securities class actions filed in state court today outside
of the M&A arena. The low number of securities class actions in the
―other‖ category is not particularly surprising quite apart from SLUSA
preclusion or CAFA preemption. Unlike Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act
and Rule 10b-5, most state blue sky laws do not provide for secondary
market liability.121 In secondary market cases, plaintiffs allege losses
due to misrepresentations and omissions of the issuer (corporations)
even though the plaintiffs purchased (or sold) the securities from others
in the secondary market. While these claims are recognized under
current Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence,122 the vast majority of state blue sky
laws limit liability for securities fraud to privity-based transactions.123
Also, state courts have uniformly rejected the fraud-on-the-market
theory necessary to establish a presumption of reliance,124 which is
integral to showing ―common issues of fact‖ at class certification.125
These dictates of state blue sky laws largely relegate state class actions
in the other category to privity-based seller/buyer fraud claims. In
combination with SLUSA and CAFA, the space for such actions is very
narrow, limited to claims arising from non-SLUSA covered securities
that involve either very small class actions or local controversies. While
several of these cases are missing from the database, this category by its
nature is unlikely to spawn class action complaints in large numbers.
Similarly, the data shows that Section 11 cases are rarely prosecuted
in state court even after the enactment of the PSLRA. In many respects,
it might have seemed logical for plaintiffs‘ lawyers to file these claims

121. Jennifer J. Johnson, Secondary Liability for Securities Fraud: Gatekeepers in State Court, 36
DEL. J. CORP. L. 463 (2011) (detailing liability under state blue sky statutes).
122. See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005) (setting forth the elements of a cause
of action under Rule 10b-5).
123. Only a very few states statutes provide a private cause of action against issuers in connection
with secondary market transactions. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 59.137 (2010); Johnson, supra note
121 (detailing primary and secondary liability for securities fraud under state blue sky laws).
124. For an explanation of the ―fraud on the market‖ presumption of reliance for class
certification, see Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241–50 (1988).
125. Both state and federal courts have reached near consensus regarding the unavailability of the
fraud-on-the-market doctrine under state blue sky laws. See, e.g., State v. Marsh & McClellan, 250 P.3d
371 (Or. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that the fraud on the market presumption not available to establish
required reliance under Oregon law); Lee v. Carter-Reed Co., L.L.C., No. A-4598-07T1, 2009 WL
2475314, at *6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 14, 2009), rev‟d, 4 A.3d 561 (N.J. 2009) (―[A]pplication
of [the fraud-on-the-market] theory is confined to federal securities fraud litigation.‖); Garcia v. Medved
Chevrolet, Inc., No. 09CA1465, 2009 WL 3765481, at *10 (Colo. App. Nov. 12, 2009) (―We are also
persuaded by a variety of state cases that have similarly rejected the invitation to apply a fraud on the
market theory to presume reliance and causation in common law fraud or statutory deceit lawsuits.‖);
Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 13 (Del. Super. Ct. 1998) (noting Delaware does not recognize a state
cause of action for fraud-on-the-market).
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in state court to avoid the PSLRA‘s procedural requirements.126 On the
other hand, crowded state dockets and the general unfamiliarity of state
court judges with federal securities law may have encouraged plaintiffs‘
attorneys to file in federal court. Also, the increased flexibility for
defendants to remove Section 11 cases to federal court under SLUSA or
CAFA may keep the numbers down as plaintiffs‘ attorneys may not find
the benefits of state court to be worth the expense of litigating remand
motions against increasing odds of failure.
The M&A data, on the other hand, raises several interesting issues.
First, the sheer volume of M&A litigation is surprising. As is typical
following a recession,
M&A activity increased in 2010.127 However, while the number of
M&A deals increased by 20%, the number of merger-objection state and
federal filings increased by a much greater percentage.128 Some of the
increase is due to the multiplicity of filings for each deal, which,
according to one informed observer, have ―grown substantially in the
past five years.‖129 The SCAS data indicates that M&A suits involving
the same deal increasingly take place in multiple state jurisdictions as
well as federal courts.130 This suggests that at least for M&A
transactions, CAFA is not reducing forum shopping in the manner
126. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1 (2006).
127. Thomson Reuters data indicate that announced M&A deals increased nearly 20% in 2010.
Quentin Webb & Denny Thomas, M&A Tops $2.2 Trillion in First Yearly Rise Since 2007, REUTERS
(Dec. 17, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/12/17/us-deals-idUSTRE6BG00D20101217.
128. All researchers following M & A class action litigation report a substantial increase in 2010,
regardless of the precise method utilized to count the lawsuits. See, e.g., CORNERSTONE RESEARCH,
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 97 (finding substantial increase in M & A litigation in recent
years) ADVISEN, MERGER OBJECTION LAWSUITS: A THREAT TO PRIMARY D&O INSURERS? (2011),
available at https://www.advisen.com/downloads/Merger_Objection_Suits.pdf (noting skyrocketing
number of M & A lawsuits in 2010); MILEV ET AL., supra note 95, at 12 (noting filings alleging breach
of fiduciary duty, two-thirds of which were M & A transactions, have nearly doubled); CORNERSTONE
RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS, supra note 95, at 33 (―In 2010 there were 40 federal
filings with allegations relating to M&A transactions, which was a 471 percent increase from the seven
such filings in 2009.‖). Press reports also document this increase in M & A filings. See, e.g., Dionne
Searcey & Ashby Jones, First the Merger, Then the Lawsuit, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 2011 at C1.
129. Elizabeth Bennett, A Great Migration of M & A Cases Out of Delaware, DEL. BUS. CT.
INSIDER (Mar. 16, 2011), http://www.delbizcourt.com/story.php?story_id=3623&A-Great-Migration-ofMA-Cases-Out-of-Delaware- (quoting Theodore N. Mirvis, Partner, Wachtell Lipton Rosen and Katz,
New York, a major M & A defense firm); see also, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 97, at 2–3 (finding that virtually every large M & A transaction in 2010 and
2011 attracted multiple lawsuits).
130. See also Committee on Securities Litigation, Coordinating Related Securities Litigation: A
Position, Paper, ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 3 (Apr. 17, 2008), available at
http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/Securities_Litigation_%20A.pdf (noting that in takeover transactions
it was becoming common for similar fiduciary duty claims to be filed in multiple jurisdictions); Cain &
Davidoff, supra note 116 (finding that in 71% of large merger transactions completed from 2005–2010,
the target is incorporated in a state other than its headquarters state allowing plaintiff attorneys
discretion over where to file suits).
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predicted by its proponents.
The multi-jurisdictional filing phenomena makes it difficult for the
courts to manage cases, as there is no prescribed procedure for
consolidation as would exist in the federal courts,131 or if multiple suits
were filed in the same state jurisdiction.132 At present, there is no formal
mechanism to coordinate suits among state courts.133 While state judges
can consider forum non conveniens motions, and motions to stay in
favor of parallel proceedings in other courts, these motions are not
always successful.134 Similarly, there is no formal coordination between
federal and state courts.135 Only under extraordinary circumstances can
a federal court interfere with parallel state proceedings. The AntiInjunction Act prohibits federal courts from enjoining parallel state
court proceedings unless expressly authorized by an act of Congress,
where necessary in aid of their jurisdiction, or to protect federal court
judgments.136 If one of these statutory exceptions applies, the All Writs
Act affirmatively authorizes federal courts to enjoin a state
proceeding.137 Plaintiffs in federal securities class actions have
131. The multidistrict litigation (MDL) statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1407, provides that related class
actions pending in multiple federal district courts can be transferred to a single federal district court for
coordinated pretrial proceedings, including class certification and appointment of class counsel. Also,
under 28 U. S. C. § 1404, federal courts can transfer any civil action to any other district that would
have jurisdiction ―for the convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice.‖
Federal courts can also obtain efficiencies through coordination. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 20 (2004).
132. Multiple suits filed in the same state court can be consolidated under state court procedures.
See, e.g., CAL. CT. R. 3.767 (2011) (―In the conduct of a class action, the court may make orders
that . . . [f]acilitate the management of class actions through consolidation, severance, coordination,
bifurcation, intervention, or joinder . . . .‖).
133. Past efforts to institute a formal process for coordination among states have failed. See UNIF.
TRANSFER OF LITIG. ACT § 201, 14 U.L.A. 677 (1991) (proposing a uniform state statute to allow
consolidation of actions pending in multiple state courts).
134. See, e.g., Rosen v. Wind River Sys., No. 4674-VCP, 2009 WL 1856460, at *5 (Del. Ch. June
26, 2009) (refusing to dismiss Delaware suit in deference to earlier litigation filed in California); see
also In re Topps Co. S‘holder Litig., 924 A.2d 951 (Del. Ch. 2007); In re Topps Co., Inc. S‘holders
Litig., No. 600715/07, 2007 WL 5018882 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 8, 2007) (explaining a situation where
Vice Chancellor Strine of the Delaware Chancery Court and New York Superior Court Justice Cahn
both refused to grant a stay in favor of the action in the other jurisdiction); see also Tonnemacher v.
Touche Ross & Co., 920 P.2d 5, 8 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996). In Tonnemacher, the court held, ―When
actions are filed in different states, invoking the authority of independent sovereigns, neither sovereign
is required to yield to the other.‖ Id. (citations omitted).
135. See COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS AND ANALYSIS (1994)
(proposing a Complex Litigation Panel that would have authority to remove related cases from state to
federal court); see also Edward H. Cooper, Interstate Consolidation: A Comparison of the ALI Project
with the Uniform Transfer of Litigation Act, 54 LA. L. REV. 897, 905–06 (1994) (comparing potential
approaches to interstate consolidation).
136. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2006).
137. The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), provides that ―[t]he Supreme Court and all courts
established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective
jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.‖ The All Writs Act is limited by the
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occasionally tried to obtain injunctions against parallel state proceedings
under the exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act with varying degrees of
success.138
The problems associated with multi-forum litigation have engendered
much recent commentary among academics and practicing attorneys.139
Moreover, Delaware chancery judges are openly discussing these issues
in court proceedings.140 Litigation in multiple forums wastes judicial
resources as judges in two or more jurisdictions must review the same
pleadings and documents, and are sometimes asked to decide the exact
same motions. When a case invariably settles, the settling judges must
arbitrate fee disputes among any non-cooperating plaintiffs‘ counsel.
Judges in non-settling forums may spend additional resources assuring
the out of state settlement is not collusive.141 As recently noted by
Chancellor Chandler:
In the worse case, if a case does not settle or consolidate in one forum,
there is the possibility that two judges would apply the law differently or
otherwise reach different outcomes, which would then leave the law in a
confused state and pose full faith and credit problems for all involved.142

Second, defense counsel must litigate the same case in multiple
courts, leading to obvious inefficiencies and increased costs. Defense

Anti-Injunction Act and in effect runs parallel to the second exception of that Act.
138. Compare Newby v. Enron Corp., 302 F.3d 295, 303 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting All Writs Act
permitted federal district court to ―issue narrowly tailored orders enjoining repeatedly vexatious litigants
from filing future state court actions without permission from the court‖), with Ret. Sys. of Ala. v. J.P.
Morgan Chase & Co. 386 F.3d 419 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting principles of federalism dictate that federal
court should not enjoin parallel state class action).
139. See, e.g., Ted Mirvis, Anywhere But Chancery: Ted Mirvis Sounds an Alarm and Suggests
Some Solutions, 7 M&A J. 17 (May 2007); Armour, Black & Cheffins, Delaware‟s Balancing Act,
supra note 115; David Marcus, Multiforum Mayhem, DEAL MAG. (Jan. 11, 2011),
http://www.thedeal.com/magazine/ID/038069/2011/multiforum-mayhem.php; Mark Lebovitch, Jerry
Silk & Jeremy Friedman, Making Order Out of Chaos: A Proposal to Improve Organization and
Coordination in Multi-Jurisdictional Merger-Related Litigation (Dec. 31, 2010) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www.blbglaw.com/misc_files/MakingOrderoutofChaos.;Edward B.
Micheletti & Jenness E. Parker, Multi-Jurisdictional Litigation: Who Caused This Problem, and Can It
Be Fixed?, DEL. J. CORP. L., Jan.–Feb. 2012, at 1.
140. See, e.g., In re Allion Healthcare Inc. S‘holders Litig., No. 5022-CC, slip op. at 9–10 (Del.
Ch. Mar. 29, 2011) (noting the increasingly problematic fallout created by the rise of multi-forum deal
litigation for which there is not yet a workable solution); In re Compellent Techs., Inc. S‘holders Litig.,
No. 6084-VCL, slip op. at 26 (Del. Ch. Jan. 13, 2011) (stating that multi-forum issues are ―a problem in
virtually every deal‖); In re Revlon, Inc. S‘holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 945–46 (Del. Ch. 2010)
(describing the predictable and abusive multi-forum filing strategy as a ―Kabuki dance‖); Transcript of
Status Conference, Scully v. Nighthawk Radiology Holdings, Inc., No. 5890-VCL (Del. Ch. Dec. 17,
2010) (suggesting possibility of collusive forum shopping).
141. For example, in Scully, No. 5890-VCL, Vice Chancellor Landis retained special counsel to
review the out-of-state settlement and instructed the parties to provide briefing on this issue.
142. In re Allion Healthcare Inc. S‘holders Litig., No. 5022-CC, slip op. at 10 (Del. Ch. Mar. 29,
2011).
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counsel may have to appear at various hearings in multiple forums,
respond to duplicative requests for discovery, and brief and argue
duplicative motions.143 For defendants, multi-forum litigation can be
disruptive and pose transaction risks, including the potential for
inconsistent rulings. Multi-forum litigation also creates an incentive for
defense counsel (who are focused on completing the M&A transaction)
to attempt a forceful consolidation of plaintiffs‘ cases, or to attempt to
―divide and conquer‖ by settling with one plaintiff group. Critics
contend that defense counsel often try to cut a quick settlement deal with
the ―weakest link‖ among plaintiffs‘ counsel,144 perhaps leading to a
collusive settlement.145 Others argue, however, that defense motivations
to settle in a particular jurisdiction are driven more by perceptions of
which judge will respond most favorably to the defendant.146
The lack of formal coordination among state and federal jurisdictions
can also lead to problems among plaintiffs‘ counsel as they jockey for
position and ultimately for fees. Several theories explain plaintiffs‘
counsel propensity to file these cases in state as opposed to federal
court, and to file in multiple jurisdictions.147 One theory is that
plaintiffs‘ counsel believe that state courts will be more sympathetic to
the interests of local claimants, especially in claims against out-of-state
defendants. This motivation has always driven forum shopping, and in
part led to the adoption of CAFA.148 Plaintiffs‘ lawyers may also
143. Silk & Friedman, supra note 139, at 2.
144. See, e.g., In re Revlon, Inc. S‟holdersLitig., 990 A.2d at 945, n.4 (―Firms who are early filers
are frequently early settlers, leading some wags in the defense bar to label them ‗Pilgrims.‘‖ (citing
Thompson & Thomas supra note 92); Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat‘l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 282 (7th Cir.
2002) (describing ―[T]he practice whereby the defendant . . . picks the most ineffectual class lawyers to
negotiate a settlement.‖); In re Mobile Commc‘ns Corp. of Am. Consol. Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 96,
558, 1991 WL 1392, at *11 (Del. Ch. Jan. 7, 1991) (―[V]alid or strong claims may be settled too cheaply
as part of an implied bargain with defendants that assures plaintiffs‘ counsel that there will be no
opposition to payment of a generous fee.‖); De Angelis v. Salton/Maxim Housewares, Inc., 641 A.2d
834, 838 (Del. Ch. 1993), rev‟d, Prezant v. De Angelis, 636 A.2d 915, 922 (Del. 1994) (―When
competition among different sets of plaintiffs‘ counsel exists, as it does here, there is the ever present
danger that unscrupulous counsel may ‗sell out‘ the class in order to receive a fee.‖).
145. See Brief of Special Counsel, Scully v. Nighthawk Radiology Holdings, Inc., No. 5890-VCL
(Del. Ch. Mar. 11, 2011) (reviewing propriety of forum shopping and providing extensive discussion of
―reverse auctions‖ and the potential for collusion in multi-forum litigation). For an earlier explanation of
the dangers inherent in the settlement of multi-jurisdictional class actions, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Class
Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1370–72 (1995) (coining
the term ―reverse auction‖ to describe collusive settlements).
146. Brief of Special Counsel, Scully, No. 5890-VCL, at 4 (noting defense counsel rarely forum
shop to settle with weakest plaintiff, rather perceptions of judicial attitudes towards settlement or
defendants‘ positions drive choice of settlement venue).
147. See, e.g., Cain & Davidoff, supra note 116 (finding in a study of large M & A deals
completed between 2005 and 2010 that plaintiffs‘ attorneys bring suits in jurisdictions that award more
favorable judgments and higher attorney‘s fees).
148. 28 U.S.C. § 1711(2)(a)(1)–(4) (2006) (highlighting ―bias against out-of-State defendants‖
among Congressional findings that motivated the Act).
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believe that their own chances to maintain control of the case increase in
uncoordinated state court filings.149 Also, the uncertainty of class
certification and other issues in untested state trial courts could spur
defense settlements.
While the first class action settlement will ordinarily bind class
members in other actions based upon the same claims, 150 defendants
often seek a global settlement as a precondition to settling with any
plaintiff class.151 The desirability of this global settlement precondition
provides leverage to plaintiffs‘ counsel who have filed in alternate
jurisdictions to demand a significant portion of legal fees. Even
plaintiffs‘ counsel who filed and consented to a stay can free ride on the
efforts of counsel in the settling jurisdiction.
Finally, the data underscores the increasing trend of plaintiffs‘
attorneys to file class action cases against Delaware corporations outside
of Delaware; a phenomena one commentator called the ―Anywhere But
Chancery‖ effect.152 Commentators suggest that a major factor
influencing this migration is that Delaware courts are becoming
increasingly diligent in policing the conduct of lead counsel 153 and the
149. See, e.g., In re Compellent Techs., Inc. S‘holder Litig., No. 6084-VCL, slip op. at 20 (Del.
Ch. Jan. 13, 2011) (―[W]hen everybody is filing in the same forum, you‘re not guaranteed to get control
of a case. But if you then go and file in another forum, you do have control of that case and then the
defendants have to deal with you. You may get control of the entire action but, at a minimum, you get
control of a piece of the litigation for purposes of the fee negotiations.‖); In re Allion Healthcare Inc.
S‘holders Litig., No. 5022-CC, slip op. at 10 (Del. Ch. Mar. 29, 2011) (noting that plaintiff‘s counsel,
unsatisfied with non-lead role it was offered in Delaware, refiled its case in New York); Armour, Black
& Cheffins, supra note 116, at 33–36 (noting that first filers are more likely to keep control of litigation
in states outside of Delaware). In federal courts, the PSLRA governs the appointment of lead counsel
under guidelines that eliminate many plaintiffs‘ lawyers from serious consideration. 15 U.S.C. § 78u4(a)(3)(B)(i) (2006).
150. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 provides that, ―Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to
the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.‖ Together with its
implementing statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006) (―The records and judicial proceedings of any court of
any [] State . . . shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States.‖), the
Full Faith and Credit Clause requires both state and federal courts to honor state court class action
settlements. Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 375, 380 (1996) (directing that a federal
court must honor a state court class action settlement even when the state court settlement released
federal claims within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts). For a recent summary of the
preclusive impact of class action settlements, see Rhonda Wasserman, Transnational Class Actions and
Interjurisdictional Preclusion, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 313, 330 (2011) (―[I]n the substantial majority
of certified class actions that settle, the judgment approving the settlement will have limited, if any,
issue preclusive effect, but it will provide robust protection against the prosecution of individual followup suits arising out of the same factual predicate as the claims raised in the class action.‖).
151. Defense motivations driving global settlements include greater protection against future
litigation and the elimination of non-settling plaintiffs‘ counsel as objectors at the class settlement
hearing.
152. Mirvis, supra note 139; see also CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, supra
note 97, at 5 (finding that 2/3 of lawsuits involving large M & A transactions involving Delaware targets
were filed outside of Delaware).
153. See, e.g., In re Revlon S‘holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 956–64 (Del. Ch. 2010) (removing
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award of attorneys‘ fees.154 For example, the Delaware courts no longer
award lead plaintiff status to the first to file.155 Other explanations
include Delaware‘s image as a manager-friendly state, and the
perception of plaintiffs‘ attorneys that settlement values may be higher
outside of the Delaware state courts, where results may be less
predictable.156
V. POTENTIAL OUTCOMES
M&A objection class actions have replaced traditional stock drop
cases as the lawsuit of choice for plaintiffs‘ securities lawyers. 157 In
many respects, from the perspective of plaintiffs‘ counsel, the M&A
state class action suits are even better than the stock drop cases. Like
the traditional pre-PSLRA securities cases, they are filed quickly,
usually within days of the announcement of an acquisition deal.158
Unlike the prior cases, they also settle quite quickly, often within two or

lead counsel for ineffective advocacy); King v. VeriFone Holdings, Inc., 994 A. 2d 354, 357 (Del. Ch.
2010) (criticizing the ―lead counsel Olympics race‖).
154. See, e.g., In re Cox Commc‘n S‘holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604 (Del. Ch. 2005) (reducing the
award of attorneys‘ fees from $5 million to approximately $1.3 Million).
155. TCW Tech. Ltd. P‘ship v. Intermedia Commc'ns, Inc., No. 18336, 19292, 19293, 2000 WL
1654504, at *3 (Del. Ch. Oct. 17, 2000) (―[N]one of the pending lawsuits . . . is entitled to any special
status as the lead or coordinating lawsuit simply by virtue of having been filed earlier than any other
pending action.‖).
156. Armour, Black & Cheffins, in a follow up to their original empirical piece, suggest four
factors contribute to the out-of-Delaware trend: ―(i) statements by Delaware judges betraying doubts
about the nature of lawsuits plaintiffs‘ lawyers tend to bring (ii) Delaware judges began cutting plaintiff
lawyers‘ fees; (iii) Delaware courts retreated from the ‗first to file‘ custom in choosing lead counsel; (iv)
and (iv) plaintiffs‘ lawyers beginning to file tagalong derivative suits, usually outside Delaware because
expedited discovery is often easier to obtain elsewhere.‖ Armour, Black & Cheffins, Delaware‟s
Balancing Act, supra note 116, at 39–40. Comments of Stuart Grant, a Delaware plaintiff‘s attorney,
suggest that plaintiffs may bring marginal cases in other jurisdictions as they do not play well in
Delaware. Bennett, supra note 129; Thomas E. Willging & Shannon R. Wheatman, Attorney Choice of
Forum in Class Action Litigation: What Difference Does It Make?, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 591, 611
(2006) (arguing that plaintiffs‘ attorneys‘ perceptions of judicial attitudes influence forum where cases
are filed).
157. One commentator refers to the resilience of plaintiffs‘ counsel as the ―Whac-a-Mole effect‖
and notes that ―if certain avenues of mass litigation are foreclosed, [mass action litigators] find other
avenues.‖ Erichson, supra note 9, at 1607.
158. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 97, at 4 (finding 2/3 of
lawsuits are filed within two weeks of an announcement); Searcey & Jones, supra note 128 (noting
merger objection suits are started within hours of the M & A announcement); TCW Tech. Ltd. P'ship.,
2000 WL 1654504, at *3 (―Too often judges of this Court face complaints filed hastily, minutes or hours
after a transaction is announced, based on snippets from the print or electronic media. Such pleadings
are remarkable, but only because of the speed with which they are filed in reaction to an announced
transaction.‖); In re Topps Co. S‘holders Litig., 924 A.2d 951, 957 (Del. Ch. 2007) (―The reality is that
every merger involving Delaware public companies draws shareholder litigation within days of its
announcement. An unseemly filing Olympiad typically ensues, with the view that speedy filing
establishes a better seat at the table for the plaintiffs‘ firms involved.‖).
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three months.159 Also, in the M&A class actions, defendants have added
incentive to settle as soon as possible, not only to avoid litigation but
also to complete the transaction at hand.160 Today most M&A objection
suits seek injunctive relief, with attorney fees comprising the only
monetary component of the settlement.161 Business lobbyists may
convince Congress to view the M&A cases as a species of strike suit, the
very situation that led to the PSLRA and SLUSA in the first place.162
One potential result of the proliferation of multi-forum M&A
objection suits is total congressional repeal of the SLUSA Delaware
Carve-Out, thereby forcing these class actions into federal court where
they will be subject to the procedural provisions of the PSLRA.
Another less drastic solution would be for Congress to revisit SLUSA
and restrict the carve-out to litigation actually filed in the courts of an
entity‘s state of incorporation. This would largely solve the multi-forum
issue and, given Delaware‘s status as the leading state of incorporations,
make the Delaware Chancery Court the sole forum for a majority of M
& A cases. There is evidence that Congress originally inserted the
Delaware Carve-Out in SLUSA, and the internal affairs/corporate
governance exception in CAFA, in light of the prestige and competency

159. See supra notes 152–53 and accompanying text.
160. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 97, at 9 (finding that
over 2/3 of lawsuits involving large M & A transactions settle within 60 days); Brief of Special Counsel,
Scully v. Nighthawk Radiology Holdings, Inc., No. 5890-VCL, slip op. at 28 (Del. Ch. Mar. 11, 2011)
(―Settlements in multi-jurisdictional deal litigation are nearly always reached quickly—defendants
trying to preserve their transactions need to resolve potential injunction motions before the deals
close.‖).
161. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 97, at 10–11 (finding that
82% of the settlements of its sample settle for additional disclosures only plus attorneys‘ fees);
ADVISEN, supra note 128 (noting few M & A objection suits result in monetary settlement). Advisen
reports that plaintiffs‘ attorneys collect an average of $500,000 per M & A objection suit. ADVISEN,
supra note 128; see also ADVISEN, supra note 95, at 2. Stanford Law School Professor Joseph
Grundfest, director of the Stanford Class Action Clearinghouse, attributes the increase in federal M & A
filings to plaintiffs‘ lawyers scrambling for new business. Karen Sloan, Securities Class Actions Inched
Up
in
2010;
Those
Targeting
M&As
Surged,
NAT‘L
L.J.
(2011),
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202478518537; see also Margaret Cronin Fisk,
Merger Claims Drive Rise in Securities Class Actions, Study Says, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 20, 2011),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-20/merger-claims-drive-rise-in-securities-class-actionsstudy-says.html.
162. ADVISEN, MANAGING RISK THROUGH THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY: AN ADVISEN BRIEFING 6
(2011) (noting that some regard merger objection suits as strike suits designed to settle quickly without
regard to the merits of the claim). Indeed, harsh language in several Delaware Chancery Court opinions
and proceedings comes very close to categorizing many M & A objection suits as ―strike suits.‖ See,
e.g., In re Cox Comm'ns, Inc. S‘holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 608 (Del. Ch. 2005) (―[H]astily-filed,
first-day complaints . . . serve no purpose other than for a particular law firm and its client to get into the
medal round of the filing speed (also formerly known as the lead counsel selection) Olympics.‖); In re
Revlon, Inc. S‘holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 945–64 (Del. Ch. 2010) (replacing lead counsel and noting
that they were ―frequent fliers‖ who did not litigate anything before entering into a settlement MOU
with defense counsel).
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of the Delaware courts.163 It is apparent that ―for one reason or another,
Delaware‘s corporate law seems to enjoy great respect on Capitol
Hill.‖164 Given the shift away from the Delaware courts, some question
the viability of the Delaware Carve-Out as it currently stands.165
Short of congressional action, states could help alleviate the multiforum litigation debacle by adopting a more formal system of state
coordination. State action could take the form of uniform laws or
interstate judicial cooperation and communication. Many state judges
do communicate with one another in the case of duplicate class action
filings, and attempt to agree which court should initially proceed with
the litigation.166 Of course, at present, no rule or state compact compels
cooperation. Perhaps states that are major players in the class action
arena could enter into a multi-state (or state/federal) compact that
mimics the federal Multi-District Litigation Panel. Certainly the
―Anywhere But Chancery‖ trend should motivate Delaware to consider
such a compact, but the inefficiencies in the current, uncoordinated state
system should animate other states as well.167 Ultimately, only a
national solution brokered by Congress would truly solve this multiforum dilemma, albeit at the cost of one more blow to federalism.
Recently, we have witnessed some pushback from corporations that
must defend suits in multiple jurisdictions. Perhaps taking the hint from
dicta in Vice Chancellor Laster‘s March, 2010 Revlon decision,168 some
163. Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbioitc Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law,
58 VAND. L. REV. 1573 (2005) (noting that Delaware‘s Senator Carper was one of eight original
sponsors, and one of a handful of Democratic supporters, of the Senate version of CAFA); Leo E.
Strine, Delaware's Corporate-Law System: Is Corporate America Buying An Exquisite Jewel Or A
Diamond In The Rough? A Response To Kahan & Kamar's Price Discrimination In The Market For
Corporate Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1257, 1273–74 (2001) (suggesting expertise and efficiency of
Delaware Courts may explain Delaware Carve-Out in SLUSA).
164. Kahan & Rock, supra note 163, at 1588.
165. See, e.g., Armour, Black & Cheffins, Delaware‟s Balancing Act, supra note 116, at 65–66;
Committee on Securities Litigation, Coordinating Related Securities Litigation, supra note 130, at 9.
166. See, e.g., In re Allion Healthcare Inc. S‘holders Litig., No. 5022-CC, slip op. at 10 n.12 (Del.
Ch. Mar. 29, 2011) (noting a preferred approach for defendants to file a common motion in all
implicated jurisdictions asking the judges to confer and decide ―in the interest of comity and judicial
efficiency, if nothing else, what jurisdiction is going to proceed and go forward and which jurisdictions
are going to stand down and allow one jurisdiction to handle the matter . . . . It is a method that has
worked for me in every instance when it was tried.‖); In re ICX Techs., Inc. S‘holder Litig., No. 5769VCL, at 4 (Del. Ch. Feb. 2, 2011) (―I do think that in this brave new world of multijurisdictional
proceedings, that the respective courts need to be kept informed about what‘s going on.‖); In re Burger
King Holdings, Inc. S‘holders Litig., No. 5808-VCL, at 10 (Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 2011) (―It‘s simply a
matter of making sure [the other court] has the information, because this is one of these many situations
that we have these days, when there is multiforum litigation going on.‖).
167. C.f. Brian M. Quinn, Shareholder Lawsuits, Status Quo Bias, and Adoption of the Exclusive
Forum Provision (Boston Coll. Law Sch., Working Paper No. 112, 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1699464 (suggesting an interstate compact as the solution but arguing that
states other than Delaware would have little incentive to join).
168. In re Revlon, Inc. S‘holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch. 2010) (―Perhaps greater
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companies have amended their bylaws or charters to provide that
Delaware courts are the exclusive jurisdiction for settling intra-corporate
disputes, including derivative and fiduciary duty claims. Corporate
advisors to Delaware corporations are increasingly recommending this
strategy.169 Venue provisions in charters should pass muster because
charter amendments require shareholder approval. With the uncertainty
of shareholder approval, however, many of the companies taking this
route prefer to place the exclusive venue provision in their bylaws,
which only requires approval by the board of directors.170 At least one
federal court, however, refused to dismiss a derivative suit for improper
venue against certain directors of the Oracle Corporation, even though
the company had a bylaw in place granting exclusive jurisdiction of
While
derivative suits to the Delaware Court of Chancery. 171
recognizing the validity of forum selection contracts, the court stated,
―[O]racle cannot persuasively contend that its bylaws are like any other
contract . . . while simultaneously arguing that it was permitted under
corporate law to amend those bylaws in a manner that it could not have
achieved under contract law.‖172
VI. CONCLUSION
Congress enacted SLUSA and CAFA to preclude and preempt
securities class actions in state court—and it has largely been successful.

judicial oversight of frequent filers will accelerate their efforts to populate their portfolios by filing in
other jurisdictions . . . . If they do, and if boards of directors and stockholders believe that a particular
forum would provide an efficient and value-promoting locus for dispute resolution, then corporations
are free to respond with charter provisions selecting an exclusive forum for intra-entity disputes.‖).
Before Revlon, the number of exclusive venue provisions in corporate charters and bylaws was quite
low, but the popularity of these provisions has grown in recent months. By December 31, 2012, 195
public companies had adopted or were in the process of adopting exclusive Delaware charter and bylaw
forum selection provisions. CLAUDIA H. ALLEN, STUDY OF DELAWARE FORUM SELECTION IN
CHARTERS AND BYLAWS
(last
updated
Apr.
7,
2011),
available
at
http://
http://www.ngelaw.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Exclusive_Forum_Provisions_Study_4_7_11.pdf.
169. See, e.g., Joseph Grundfest, Choice of Forum Provisions in Intra-Corporate Litigation:
Mandatory and Elective Approaches (Stanford Law Rock Center for Corporate Governance, Working
Paper No. 91, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1690561); Latham & Watkins, Designating
Delaware‟s Court of Chancery as the Exclusive Jurisdiction for Intra-Corporate Disputes: A New
“Must” for Delaware Company Charter or Bylaws, CORP. GOVERNANCE COMMENT. 4 (Apr. 2010),
available at http://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub3510_1.pdf; see also Quinn, supra note
167 (analyzing rationale of many companies who do not adopt such clauses).
170. ALLEN, supra note 168. As of December 31, 2011, 35.4% of issuers who have adopted or
are in the process of adopting exclusive venue provisions did so in their bylaws, while 55.9% proceeded
or are proceeding by means of a charter provision. Id. However over 95% of the exclusive venue
charter provisions were adopted as part of an IPO or other transaction that does not require shareholder
approval.
171. Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2011).
172. Id. at 1174.
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In combination, these statutes leave little room for plaintiffs‘ lawyers to
bring traditional securities stock-drop class actions in state court. The
data depicting class action filings in state court from 1996–2010
confirms that very few traditional securities class actions now proceed in
state court, and that they are primarily confined to local controversies
involving private offerings. Similarly, in spite of the theoretical
controversy over the appropriate interaction between SLUSA and CAFA
and Section 11 of the 1933 Act, very few IPO cases now proceed in
state court.
Regarding M&A transactions, the data tells a different story. The
number of M&A class action objection suits has mushroomed over the
past few years and state court is indeed the preferred venue for this
litigation. Taking advantage of the SLUSA ―Delaware Carve-Out,‖
plaintiffs‘ counsel are filing merger objection class actions in record
numbers and in multiple forums, usually alleging a violation of state
fiduciary duty law or related violations under state securities statutes.
This multi-forum litigation is causing increasing problems for
defendants, the judiciary, and sometimes even for plaintiffs‘ counsel
who must negotiate with uncooperative members of their brethren.
Increasingly, Delaware judges are openly lamenting, if not criticizing,
the multi-forum practice as Delaware loses cases to other jurisdictions.
Merger activity continues to increase along with a corresponding
increase in multi-forum M&A objection suits.173 Perhaps effective state
coordination or self-help venue restrictions in corporate charters could
help stem this tide. Absent a major change, however, the proliferation
of M&A objection suits is likely to come to the attention of Congress.
Much like the alleged abuses concerning traditional securities class
actions that led to the passage of the PLSRA in 1995, SLUSA in 1998,
and CAFA in 2005, we should not be surprised to see congressional
action eliminating or restricting the Delaware Carve-Out.

173. See, e.g., CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 97, at 2 (finding
the average number of merger objection suits for largest transactions rose from 5.4 in 2010 to 6.1 in
2011).
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